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Abstract—DNNs shall be considered as the intellectual prop-
erty (IP) of the model builder due to the impeding cost of de-
signing/training a highly accurate model. Research attempts have
been made to protect the authorship of the trained model and pre-
vent IP infringement using DNN watermarking techniques. In this
paper, we provide a comprehensive performance comparison of
the state-of-the-art DNN watermarking methodologies according
to the essential requisites for an effective watermarking technique.
We identify the pros and cons of each scheme and provide insights
into the underlying rationale. Empirical results corroborate that
DeepSigns framework proposed in [4] has the best overall
performance in terms of the evaluation metrics. Our comparison
facilitates the development of pending watermarking approaches
and enables the model owner to deploy the watermarking scheme
that satisfying her requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly commer-
cialized due to their unprecedented performance. Training a
DNN is expensive since it requires: (i) availability of sufficient
amounts of proprietary data that captures different scenarios in
the target application; and (ii) allocation of DL design experts
and extensive computational resources to carefully fine-tune
of the network topology (i.e., type and number of hidden
layers), hyper-parameters (i.e., learning rate, batch size, etc.),
and weights. With the growing deployment in various fields,
high-performance DNNs shall be considered as the IP of the
model owner and need to be protected.
Several papers have proposed leveraging digital water-
marking to address the IP protection concern in the deep
learning (DL) domain. Existing DNN watermarking techniques
can be categorized into two types based on the underlying
assumptions. White-box watermarking encodes the watermark
information (typically a ‘multi-bit’ binary string) in the model
internals (e.g., weights, activations) and assumes that these
internal details are known to the public. This assumption
holds when DNNs are voluntarily shared in the model dis-
tribution system. Black-box watermarking assumes that the
model owner only has API access to the remotely deployed
model (send queries and receive the corresponding outputs).
The black-box application scenario is common in Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS) systems [3].
In this paper, we implement the state-of-the-art DNN
watermarking methodologies and compare their performance
according to a set of essential metrics for an effective water-
marking technique. As we empirically corroborate, DeepSigns
framework proposed in [4] has the best overall performance
and respects all criteria. DeepSigns is also the first and the only
watermarking framework that is applicable in both white-box
and black-box settings.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we survey the present white-box and
black-box DNN watermarking papers. To provide a fair com-
parison, we deploy the requirements for an effective DNN
watermarking methodology as shown in Table I. For details
about the definition of each criterion, we refer the readers
to the paper [4]. We summarize the workflow, advantages,
and disadvantages of each watermarking method in Table II.
The quantitative performance comparison of these techniques
is given in Section III. Potential watermark (WM) removal
attacks are discussed in Section II-C.
A. White-box Watermarking
White-box WMs have the advantage of larger capacity
(carrying more information). However, the capability to con-
vey abundant information comes at the cost of the limited
application scenarios since the model internals are required
to be publicly available for WM extraction. The Bit Error
Rate (BER) between the extracted WM and the ground-
truth one needs to be zero to prove the authorship of the
queried model. There are two papers providing white-box
watermarking techniques and we discuss the mechanism of
each approach as follows.
Uchida et al. The paper [6] presents the first DNN watermark-
ing technique that embeds the owner’s watermark information
(a binary string) in the weights of the selected layer(s) in the
target model. More specifically, the WM is encoded in distri-
bution of the weights by training the DNN with a customized
regularization loss that penalizes the difference between the
desired WM and the transformation of weights. The WM
is later extracted from the queried model by computing the
transformation of the marked weights.
Rouhani et al. DeepSigns proposed in [4] is the first generic
watermarking framework that is applicable in both white-box
and black-box settings. We describe its workflow of white-box
watermarking here. DeepSigns assumes a Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) as the prior probability distribution (pdf) for the
activation maps. The WM is embedded in the pdf of activations
triggered by the selected WM key images. Two WM-specific
regularization loss terms are incorporated during DNN training
to align the activations and encode the WM information. In
the WM extraction stage, the WM key images are passed
through the queried model and trigger the marked activations.
The WM is recovered from the transformation of the resulting
activations and the BER is computed.
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TABLE I: Requirements for an effective DNN watermarking scheme [4].
Requirements Description
Fidelity Accuracy of the target neural network shall not be degraded as a result of watermark embedding.
Reliability Watermark extraction shall yield minimal false negatives; WM shall be effectively detected using the pertinent keys.
Robustness Embedded watermark shall be resilient against model modifications such as pruning, fine-tuning, or WM overwriting.
Integrity Watermark extraction shall yield minimal false alarms (a.k.a., false positives); the watermarked model should be uniquely identified using the pertinent keys.
Capacity Watermarking methodology shall be capable of embedding a large amount of information in the target DNN.
Efficiency Communication and computational overhead of watermark embedding and extraction shall be negligible.
Security The watermark shall be secure against brute-force attacks and leave no tangible footprints in the target neural network; thus, an unauthorized party cannot
detect/remove the presence of a watermark.
TABLE II: Summary of contemporary DNN watermarking methods.
Setting Paper Scheme Pros Cons
White-box Uchida etal. [6]
Embeds the multi-bit WM in the weights of the selected
layer(s) of the target DNN by adding an additive binary
cross-entropy loss as the WM regularization term.
Retains the accuracy of the model;
Robust against model compression
and fine-tuning attacks.
Vulnerable to WM overwriting
attacks. WM is not data-aware.
Rouhani
et al. [4]
Embeds the multi-bit WM in the activation maps of the
selected layer(s) of the target DNN by incorporating two
additional regularization loss terms (GMM center loss and
binary cross-entropy loss).
Simultaneous model-aware and
data-aware; Robust against WM
overwriting, parameter pruning,
and model fine-tuning.
WM embedding requires more
computation.
Black-box
Merrer et
al. [2]
Crafts a set of adversarial samples as the WM key set to
alter the decision boundary of the target DNN. The
designed WM key image label pairs serve as a zero-bit
WM.
Efficient WM embedding and
detection.
Accuracy might degrade after
WM embedding; Incurs a high
false positive rate; Not robust
against attacks.
Yossi et
al. [1]
Leverages backdoor images (misclassified) and random
labels as the WM key set to embed the zero-bit WM in the
pertinent DNN.
Preserve the accuracy of the
model; Yields a high detection
rate.
Susceptible to WM removal
attacks; High overhead to embed
the WM.
Zhang et
al. [7]
Proposes three key generation algorithms (content-based,
unrelated-based, noise-based) to craft the WM key images.
Provides three different types of
WM key generation methods.
Inconsistent performance across
different benchmarks.
Rouhani
et al [4]
Explores the rarely occupied space within the target DNN
to design random image and label pairs as the WM key set.
Yields a high detection rate and a
low false alarm rate.
Key generation process incurs
higher overhead.
B. Black-box Watermarking
Current black-box watermarking methods [2], [7], [4], [1]
target at ‘zero-bit’ watermarking, which is only concerned
about the existence of the WM. A set of WM key pairs is
generated to strategically alter the decision boundary of the
target model. The presence of the WM is determined by query-
ing the model with the WM key images and thresholding the
corresponding accuracy. Black-box WMs are more practical in
the real-world settings due to the relaxed assumption (requiring
API access instead of model internals) but possesses limited
capacity. We discuss the working mechanisms of existing
black-box watermarking techniques as follows.
Merrer et al. [2] proposes to craft adversarial samples as
the WM key set for WM embedding. When the adversarial
attack succeeds, the corresponding sample are referred to as
‘true adversaries’ that carries the WM information. When the
attack fails, the generated images are referred to as ‘false
adversaries’ that are used to preserve the accuracy of the
model on legitimate data. The combination of true and false
adversaries forms the complete WM key set. In the WM
detection phase, the model is queried by the WM key images
and a statistical null-hypothesis testing is performed assuming
a binomial distribution. If the number of mismatches between
the model’s response and the WM key labels is smaller than
the threshold, the WM is decided to be existent in the model.
Yossi et al. [1] suggests to use the backdoors (images that
are misclassified by the model) as the WM key images. The
corresponding key label is randomly sampled from all classes
excluding the ground-truth label and the original predicted one.
The WM is detected by comparing the accuracy on the WM
trigger set with the threshold determined by binomial distri-
bution. Furthermore, [1] suggests to deploy the commitment
scheme for constructing a publicly verifiable protocol.
Zhang et al. [7] presents three different WM key generation
methods that leverage unrelated images in another dataset, the
training image superimposed with additional meaning content,
and random images, respectively. The WM keys are then used
to fine-tune the pre-trained model. During the WM detection
stage, the owner sends the WM key images to the remote DNN
service provider and thresholds the classification accuracy to
make the Boolean decision.
Rouhani et al. [4] first generates an initial WM key set that
consists of random image and random labels pairs. The initial
key set is used for two purposes: (i) identifying the key pairs
that are misclassified by the original unmarked model; and
(ii) fine-tuning the target model for WM embedding. The final
WM key set is the intersection of the keys that are correctly
predicted by the marked model and falsely predicted by the
unmarked model. To detect the watermark, [4] assumes a
multinomial distribution for the output prediction and performs
the null-hypothesis testing with the final WM key set.
C. Attack Model
To validate the robustness of a potential DL watermarking
approach, one should evaluate the robustness of the proposed
methodology against (at least) three types of contemporary
attacks: (i) model fine-tuning. This attack involves re-training
of the original model to alter the model parameters and find a
new local minimum while preserving the accuracy. (ii) model
pruning. Model pruning is a common approach for efficient
DNN execution, particularly on embedded devices. We identify
model pruning as another attack approach that might affect the
watermark extraction/detection. (iii) watermark overwriting.
A third-party user who is aware of the methodology used for
DNN watermarking (but does not know the owner’s private
WM keys) may try to embed a new watermark in the model
and overwrite the original one. An overwriting attack intends
to insert an additional watermark in the model and render
the original one undetectable. A watermarking methodology
should be robust against fine-tuning, pruning, and overwriting
for effective IP protection.
III. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we provide a quantitative comparison of
the papers summarized in Table II. We implement the white-
box weights watermarking [6] using their open-sourced code
in [5]. All the other watermarking techniques are implemented
based on the work flow and experimental setup described
in the original papers. It is worth noting that [7] does not
provide the decision threshold for WM detection. We use
as 80% accuracy on the WM key set as the WM detection
threshold in our experiments to provide a fair comparison
with other watermarking methods. We explicitly compare the
watermarking performance regarding each metric discussed in
Table I as follows.
A. Fidelity
To assess the fidelity of the watermarking techniques, we
compare the test accuracy of the target model before and
after WM embedding. The results in the white-box and black-
box setting are shown in Table III and Table IV, respectively.
The averaged test accuracy of the marked model using three
different WM key generation algorithms in [7] is reported in
the last row of Table IV. One can be see that both [6] and [4]
white-box watermarking methodologies are able to preserve
the accuracy of the original model (shown in the parenthesis)
due to the simultaneous optimization of the conventional cross-
entropy loss together with the WM-specific regularization loss.
As for the black-box watermarking approaches, [2] suffers
from accuracy degradation on two CIFAR-10 benchmarks
while the other methods preserve the same level of accuracy
compared to the baseline across various benchmarks. The
reason is that [2] only uses K crafted adversarial samples
(K = 20 in the experiment) to embed the WM, which does not
capture sufficient coverage of the data in the target application.
The other three watermarking methods use a mixture of the
original training data (or a subset of it) and the designed WM
key images, thus do not induce a significant accuracy drop.
TABLE III: Fidelity evaluation of two white-box watermarking
schemes. The test accuracy after embedding a 4-bit WM and the
baseline accuracy (in parenthesis) are shown.
White-box WM BenchmarksMNIST-MLP CIFAR10-CNN CIFAR10-WRN
Uchida [6] 98.34% (98.54%) 80.06% (78.47%) 91.63% (91.42%)
Rouhani [4] 98.13% (98.54%) 80.70% (78.47%) 92.02% (91.42%)
TABLE IV: Fidelity evaluation of four black-box watermarking
methods. The WM key length is set to 20. The test accuracy before
(in parenthesis) and after WM embedding is compared.
Black-box WM BenchmarksMNIST-MLP CIFAR10-CNN CIFAR10-WRN ImageNet-ResNet50
Merrer [2] 98.24%(98.54%) 77.03%(80.60%) 77.0%(91.42%) 74.73%(74.73%)
Rouhani [4] 98.61% (98.54%) 81.48% (78.47%) 92.03% (91.42%) 73.83% (74.73%)
Yossi [1] 97.48%(98.54) 80.18%(80.60%) 91.36%(91.42%) 74.73%(74.73%)
Zhang [7] 98.51% (98.54%) 77.53 (78.47%) 91.65% (91.42%) 74.09% (74.73%)
B. Robustness
In the following of this section, we compare the robustness
of the embedded WM against three types of WM removal
attacks discussed in Section II-C.
(i) Model Fine-tuning Attack. This attack involves retraining
the watermarked model with the conventional cross-entropy
loss on the original training dataset. In the white-box setting,
a robust WM shall be able to yield zero BER after the
weights/activations are changed during model fine-tuning. In
the black-box setting, the prediction accuracy of the queried
model on the WM key set shall be larger than the decision
threshold for the WM to be robust. The results in both
scenarios are summarized in Table 1. A watermarking method
is robust if the embedded WM can withstand the fine-tuning
attack across all benchmarks. We use a single column to
denote its performance for simplicity since all three WM key
generation algorithms are robust.
Fig. 1: Robustness comparison of watermarking methods against
model fine-tuning attacks.
(ii) Parameter Pruning Attack. We prune the model by
setting the weights with small magnitudes to zeros. We first
compare the robust of two white-box watermarking frame-
works on three benchmarks shown in Table III. Since the
relative performance of [6] and [4] is the same across different
benchmarks, we only visualize the results on CIFAR10-WRN
benchmark in Figure 2. one can see that: (i). both [6] and [4]
can withstand a wide range of parameter pruning; (ii). directly
embedding the WM information in weights ([6]) is slightly
more robust against pruning attacks compared to activation-
based WM embedding ([4]).
Fig. 2: Robustness comparison of two white-box watermarking
methods against parameter pruning attacks. A binary string of length
128 is embedded in the second last dense layer of the WRN model.
We also compare the robustness of four black-box water-
marking methods against parameter pruning attacks. Since the
performance of [2] and [1] is not uniform across different
benchmarks, we show the results on CIFAR10-WRN and
ImageNet-ResNet in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The WM key
length is set to K = 20. The content-based, unrelated-based,
noise-based WM key generation methods in [7] are denoted as
‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ in the figures, respectively. It can be seen that [4]
and [7] has consistent high WM detection rate on middle and
large scale datasets when the model is pruned for a wide range
of values. The noise-based WM key generation method in [7]
is more robust against parameter pruning attacks compared to
the content-based and unrelated-based methods. [2] and [1]
yield lower detection rates against parameter pruning attacks
on CIFAR10-CNN compared to ImageNet-ResNet benchmark,
which makes the watermarking methods not desirable for
practical usage.
Fig. 3: Robustness comparison of four black-box watermarking meth-
ods against parameter pruning attacks on CIFAR10-CNN benchmark.
Note that [2], [1], and the content-based WM in [7] has zero detection
rate on this benchmark and their corresponding lines completely
overlap in the plot.
Fig. 4: Average WM detection rates of black-box watermarking meth-
ods under different pruning rates on the ImageNet-ResNet benchmark.
Note that all three WM key generation methods in [7] are vulnerable
to parameter pruning, yielding zero detection rate on this benchmark.
(iii) Watermark Overwriting Attack.
Table V provides a side-by-side robustness comparison
between [4] and [6] white-box watermarking methodologies
for different dimensionality ratio (defined as the ratio of the
length of the attacker’s WM signature to the size of weights or
activations). As can be seen from the table, embedding WM in
the dynamic activation maps suggested by DeepSigns is more
robust against WM overwriting attack compared to embedding
WM in the weights as proposed in [6].
TABLE V: Robustness comparison against WM overwriting attacks
on CIFAR10-WRN benchmark. The WM information embedded
by [4] can withstand overwriting attacks for a wide of range of N
M
ratio compared to [6].
N to M Ratio Bit Error Rate (BER)Uchida et al. [6] Rouhani et al. [4]
1 0.309 0
2 0.41 0
3 0.511 0
4 0.527 0
Figure 5 illustrates the robustness comparison results of
black-box watermarking methods against WM overwriting
attacks. The approach is marked as ‘robust’ only when it
withstands the overwriting attack across all benchmarks shown
in Table IV. It can be seen that [4] and the unrelated WM in [7]
are robust against WM overwriting attacks.
Fig. 5: Robustness comparison of black-box watermarking methods
against WM overwriting attacks.
C. Integrity
Integrity requires that the authorship of an unmarked model
will not be falsely claimed by the watermarking methodology.
In the white-box setting, if the owner tries to extract a WM
from an unmarked model, the computed BER shall be a non-
zero to satisfy the integrity requirement. We follow the WM
extraction procedure in paper [6] and [4] to evaluate their
integrity. The resulting BER has a large value (around 0.5)
in both cases, suggesting these two white-box watermarking
methods satisfy the integrity criterion.
Fig. 6: Integrity comparison of black-box watermarking methods.
In the black-box setting, integrity requires that the existence
of the WM will not be falsely detected by the watermarking
scheme. We assess the integrity of each black-box watermark-
ing method in Table IV as follows. Three unmarked models
with the same and different topologies as the watermarked
variant are evaluated. The watermarking scheme is decided
to be ‘integrate’ when the WM is not detected in all six
models across various benchmark. Figure 6 shows the integrity
comparison results in the black-box scenario. Only the wa-
termarking method in [2] violates the integrity requirement
(yields a high false alarm rate) since the crafted WM key
images are adversarial samples that are transferable to other
models which might not be watermarked.
IV. CONCLUSION
We provide a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative
comparison of the state-of-the-art DNN watermarking method-
ologies in both white-box and black-box settings. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each evaluated watermarking
scheme are identified. Experimental results corroborate that
DeepSigns framework proposed in [4] outperforms the other
watermarking techniques by designing a robust WM that
is applicable in both application scenarios. Our side-by-side
performance comparison helps the research communities to
develop more advanced watermarking methodologies. Prac-
titioners can also use the comparison results as a reference
to determine the appropriate watermarking framework that
satisfies their performance requirements.
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